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These variables are interrelated and need to be considered
in a broad range of situations. Empirical techniques allow
us to manipulate these variables, conduct the experiments
and analyze the results.
In more detail, we use the exploratory studies evaluation
technique [3]. With this method, general hypotheses are
formed to express the intuitions about the causal factors
within the model. The experiments are then conducted and
generate the results that either support these hypotheses or
go against them. In our evaluation, the independent vari-
ables are given in table 3 and the dependent ones are listed
in table 4.
Variables Descriptions values
½0 the initial penalty fee [5,100]
½max the ¯nal penalty fee (½max ¸ ½0) [5,100]
¿ the ¹ threshold [0,0.8]
Table 3: The independent variables.
Apart from the control variables described in table 3,
other control variables are selected as per [12]. Speci¯cally,
the number of seller agents (n) is set in the range of [1, 30]
and the number of negotiation issues (m) is set in the range
of [1, 8]. An agent ®'s preference for issue j is represented
by the tuple fx
®
jmin;x
®
jmax;w
®
j g. The tuple [x
®
jmin, x
®
jmax] is
an interval independent variable, whose scale is in¯nite. To
simplify the analysis, therefore, we assume all issues have
the same domain of values and we randomly set the value
for x
®
jmin to be in the interval [0, 20] and x
®
jmax to be in the
interval [30, 50]. The values for w
®
j are set to give all issues
equal importance. The negotiation deadline for each agent
is an ordinal independent variable, whose value is randomly
chosen, ranging from 5 (very short deadline) to 50 (long
deadline). The penalty fee (both initial and ¯nal) is also an
ordinal independent variable, whose value is randomly cho-
sen, ranging from 5% (small) to 100% (equal to the value of
the contract). Similarly, the ¿ threshold is either 0 (mean-
ing the buyer is greedy and will commit to any intermediate
deal that it can get hold of) or 0.5 (meaning the buyer is
patient and will only engage on a deal that provides high
expected utility value)
5.
The seller agents in this evaluation are characterized in a
similar fashion to ones set up in our previous experiments
[12]. Speci¯cally, they are characterized by three indepen-
dent variables whose values are set in the following manner:
² the values' domain for the set of negotiation issues:
These domains are randomly generated (from the same
distribution as the buyer agents' values) so that each
domain intersects with the corresponding domain of
the buyer's preference. For example, if the buyer's
value domain for an issue j is [x
b
jmin;x
b
jmax] then the
corresponding value domain for seller ® will be gener-
ated as [x
®
jmin;x
®
jmax] that satis¯es x
b
jmin · x
®
jmin ·
x
b
jmax · x
®
jmax.
² the negotiation strategy: Each seller is assigned a ran-
dom strategy selected from a prede¯ned set of alter-
nations (as outlined in [6]). This set is composed of
time-dependant functions (like conceder, boulware and
5Future work will investigate in more detail how this value
a®ects the outcome of the model.
linear) and behavior-dependant tactics (such as tit-for-
tat in its various forms).
² the negotiation deadline: The deadline for each seller is
generated from the same distribution as for the buyer.
The only di®erence is that now if a seller has committed
to a deal, it has a chance of being made an outside o®er with
the utility value of 1.0 (which is the highest possible utility
value). Thus, there is a probability that it will decommit.
To this end, we consider three types of sellers:
² loyal: once a seller has committed to an intermediate
deal, it will not renege from it.
² loose: a seller always breaks a committed deal if it is
presented with a better option.
² partial: if a seller ¯nds a better option, it will break
a committed deal with a percentage of probability (as
per ??. In this experiment, we set this percentage to
be 50%, meaning that half of the time a seller ¯nds a
better deal, it will renege and half of the time it will
stay with its current deal.
Variables Descriptions
U the utility value of the ¯nal agreement
N the number of successful negotiations
D the number of decommitments made by buyer
Table 4: The dependent variables.
After each experiment, we measure the utility value of
the ¯nal agreement for the buyer (U). In our evaluation,
the utility of an o®er X = fx1;x2 :::xmg to an agent ® is
calculated as:
U(X) =
m X
j=1
w
®
j ¢
xj ¡ x
®
jmin
x®
jmax ¡ x®
jmin
We also measure the number of agreements reached at
the end of the negotiation encounter (N) and the average
number of decommitments that the buyer made (D). In all
cases, the results are gathered from a series of experiments
in di®erent environment settings. Each experiment consists
of 1000 runs and the results are averaged and put through
a regression test to ensure that all di®erences are signi¯cant
at the 99% con¯dence level.
We now turn to the speci¯c hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. When dealing with loose or partial sell-
ers, the higher the penalty fee is, the lower the number of
¯nal agreements reached by the buyer.
To evaluate this hypothesis, we measure the number of ¯-
nal agreements achieved with varying types of seller agents
(see ¯gure 2). As can be seen, the number of ¯nal agree-
ments reached by the buyer is dramatically reduced as the
penalty fee is increased. Speci¯cally, when dealing with
loose sellers, around 97% of the negotiations are successful
when the penalty fee is 5%. As the penalty fee increases to
100%, this success rate drops down to only 84%. Similarly,
the ¯gures when dealing with partial sellers are 98% and820
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Figure 2: Number of successful negotiations for
varying penalty fee.
92%, respectively. This decreasing trend is explained by the
deliberation mechanism of the buyer. Speci¯cally, assume
that the buyer has already made a commitment with seller
® and now it is presented with another o®er from seller ®
0.
If it decides to take this new o®er from ®
0, it will have to pay
® a decommitment fee ½. As the penalty fee is increased, so
is ½. Thus, in some cases, the buyer cannot a®ord to take
this new o®er and it has to stay with its commitment to ®.
Later on, if ® decides to break its commitment, the buyer
is left with no intermediate agreement. As such, there may
not be enough time for the buyer to ¯nd another replace-
ment deal and, thus, no ¯nal agreement can be reached. On
the other hand, if the buyer can take the o®er from ®
0, the
probability that ®
0 will renege is less than that of ®. Thus,
a ¯nal agreement can be reached.
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Figure 3: Final utility value for varying penalty fee.
Another observation is that the more loyal the seller is,
the greater the number of ¯nal agreements that the buyer
makes. This di®erence is caused by the probability of the
sellers breaking their commitments. Since a loyal seller never
reneges, once it has committed, its contract is kept until
either it is declined by the buyer or selected as the ¯nal
agreement. Therefore, once an intermediate deal is reached,
a ¯nal agreement is always guaranteed to exist. However,
this is not the case for the other types of sellers. Once they
have committed, it is not guaranteed that they will actually
stay faithful with their commitments. If a seller breaks a
contract, the buyer has to ¯nd a replacement. If it fails to
do so, no ¯nal agreement will be achieved. Thus, the less
loyal the sellers are, the fewer chances there are for the buyer
to reach a ¯nal agreement.
Hypothesis 2. The higher the penalty fee, the lower the
utility of the ¯nal agreement gained by the buyer.
As can be seen from ¯gure 3, this trend is true for all
seller types. Speci¯cally, when dealing with loose sellers, the
average utility of the ¯nal agreement for the buyer drops
from 0.61 to 0.46 when the penalty fee goes from 5% to
100%. The corresponding ¯gures for partial and loyal sellers
are 0.62 to 0.43 and 0.63 to 0.40, respectively. The reason for
this decrease in the ¯nal utility value is that higher penalty
fees mean more chance that the buyer will commit to an
early agreement (and stay with this commitment until either
its deadline is reached or the corresponding seller decides
to renege). These early commitments by the buyer have
two main e®ects. First, such agreements tend to have lower
utility value for the buyer, compared to the contracts that
are o®ered at a later stage (the buyer cannot a®ord to take
these contracts due to high decommitment fees). Second,
once that commitment is later broken, the buyer will have
to ¯nd a replacement. Even if it is successful in ¯nding one,
since there is not much time for bargaining, the utility value
of this newly found agreement is likely to be less than that
of the previous deal. Consequently, the utility gained by the
buyer is reduced.
Furthermore, with increasing penalty fee, the more loyal
the seller, the lower the value of the ¯nal agreement gained
by the buyer (see ¯gure 3). The reason for this observation
is because the buyer bene¯ts from the decommitment fee
gained when a seller reneges from a committed deal. As per
our experimental setup, loose sellers decommit more often
than partial sellers and loyal sellers never renege. Thus, as
the penalty fee increases, the buyer will bene¯t more when
dealing with less royal sellers.
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Figure 4: Number of buyer's decommitments for
varying penalty fee.
Hypothesis 3. The buyer decommits less frequently as
the penalty fee increases.